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INTRODUCTION

A conundrum that continues to divide Congress, frustrate American plaintiffs, confuse federal courts, and embarrass the executive
branch is the unfulfilled promise of legislation that grants United
States domestic courts jurisdiction to hear disputes brought against
foreign countries for injuries that occur overseas. As cases brought
pursuant to this legislation reach the execution phase, plaintiffs routinely discover that the emotional energy and financial resources they
invested to obtain a favorable verdict were inevitably expended in
vain.1 Plaintiffs and judges alike absorb the hard lesson that statutes
granting courts jurisdiction to award financial remedies against foreign countries paradoxically fail to empower plaintiffs to satisfy the
2
verdicts they lawfully obtain.
The most recent legislation to befuddle plaintiffs who seek justice
against foreign countries is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA). 3 In 1996, Congress amended the FSIA to allow plaintiffs to
sue foreign countries in American courts for noncommercial injuries
including acts of torture, murder, and terrorism that are committed
overseas, and further authorized federal courts to award punitive damages as well as compensatory damages to victorious plaintiffs. 4 While
this expansion of jurisdiction was highly controversial, trial courts
have willingly accepted jurisdiction under the FSIA, and in some cases
have awarded plaintiffs verdicts in the hundreds of millions of dollars. 5 To the consternation of successful litigants, however, courts
have refused to interpret the FSIA to provide for the enforcement of
these judgments through writs of attachment and execution. 6
Significantly, the difficulty of satisfying verdicts under the FSIA is
confined to noncommercial injury cases brought under the 1996
amendments. In contrast, the process of remedying commercial injuries under the FSIA functions relatively smoothly for several reasons.
1
See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 27 (D.D.C. 1999)
("[T]he Court regrets that plaintiff's efforts to satisfy his judgment against Iran have
proven futile. Indeed, in light of his lack of success thus far, it appears that plaintiff
Flatlow's original judgment against Iran has come to epitomize the phrase 'Pyrrhic
victory."').
2 See, e.g., Jean-Marie Simon, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Justice or Show Trials?, 11 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1993); Jennifer Correaie, Comment, The Torture Victim Protection Act: A Vital
Contribution to InternationalHuman Rights Enforcement orJust a Nice Gesture?, 6 PACE INT'L L.
REv. 197 (1994); Christopher W. Haffke, Note, The Torture Victim ProtectionAct: More Symbol
than Substance, 43 EMoRY LJ. 1467 (1994).
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
4 Id. § 1605(a) (7) (Supp. V 1999); see, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.
Supp. 1, 12-13, 32-34 (D.D.C. 1998).
5 See Flatow,999 F. Supp. at 33 (citing an award of $137.3 million in punitive damages
for a case involving murder of three American aircraft pilots).
6 See e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999).
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First, the property at issue in a commercial dispute under the FSIA is
always available for attachment to satisfy a judgment. 7 Second, punitive damages are unavailable for commercial claims brought under
the FSIA; thus, the remedies awarded to the prevailing party are
merely compensatory and much smaller in magnitude than the verdicts in noncommercial claims.8 Finally, foreign countries that are
parties to commercial litigation under the FSIA typically have significant business ties to the United States, and defendant countries therefore have financial incentives to comply with the judgments of
American courts. For these reasons, even plaintiffs who suffer commercial injuries at the hands of uncooperative defendants have little
trouble finding and attaching property of a foreign country defendant
that is located within the United States. 9
The unique nature of the jurisdiction granted by the 1996
amendments portends the difficulty of satisfying judgments in the
noncommercial realm.' 0 First, the 1996 amendments require that the
injury inflicted by the foreign country arises from an act of terrorism
or torture." Unlike commercial claims, which inherently involve
property that could be attached to satisfy a judgment, claims arising
from acts of terrorism and torture do not implicate resources that can
be readily attached if the plaintiff is victorious at trial. Second, the
1996 amendments grant jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies that
arise outside the borders of the United States.' 2 In general, plaintiffs
cannot enforce American court judgments overseas absent a treaty;
plaintiffs seeking to satisfy a verdict under the 1996 amendments are
thereby disadvantaged relative to plaintiffs satisfying a commercial injury that occurred within the United States.' 3 Third, judges may use
their discretion to award punitive damages on top of compensatory
damages under the 1996 amendments, and successful plaintiffs face
the daunting task of satisfying verdicts that can total hundreds of millions of dollars. Fourth, jurisdiction under the 1996 amendments is
only available if the State Department designates the defendant as a
7

8

See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1994).
See id. § 1606 (Supp. V 1999); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259

(D.D.C. 1980).
9 See, e.g., Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F.
Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980).
10 See Molora Vadnais, Comment, The TerrorismException to the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act: ForwardLeaningLegislation orJust Bad Law?, 5 UCLAJ. INT'L L.& FoRE GN AFF. 199,
216-20 (2000).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. V 1999).
12
Id.
13 See Terrorism: Victims' Access to Terrorist Assets: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. at 17 (1999) [hereinafter Terrorism Hearing] (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) ("There really is no other option for them. They cannot go to the country
at issue and demand payment.").
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"state sponsor of terrorism. 1 1 4 Not surprisingly, these defendant
countries typically have tenuous diplomatic relations with the United
States and thus control few assets within its borders. 15 Finally, any
property belonging to a designated rogue nation that could otherwise
be attached by plaintiffs is often subject to unilateral executive action
that renders the property immune from attachment for diplomatic
16
reasons.
This Note is the first attempt to formulate a reasoned solution to
these unsatisfying paradoxes posed by the 1996 amendments to the
FSIA. Of the few commentators who have examined the problem of
unsatisfied judgments under the FSIA, 17 none have undertaken an indepth analysis of the psychological and political factors that contribute to the current predicament. This Note diverges from prior examinations by piecing together the components of a viable solution
through an examination of the individual, political, and institutional
forces that create daunting obstacles for plaintiffs, and that compel
the impracticality of any radical shift from the status quo.
Initially, this Note contends that the impracticality of satisfying
noncommercial FSIAjudgments under these conditions reflects myopia on the part of legislators who drafted the execution provisions
under the 1996 amendments. An in-depth analysis of Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran18 reveals the need to reform the current adjudicative
regime that encourages plaintiffs to expend their resources to obtain
financial judgments only to encounter insurmountable obstacles to
the successful execution of their judgments.
This Note then looks beyond the particular obstacles to execution under the 1996 amendments and addresses the larger question of
how best to remedy legislation that confers "hollow rights," which cannot be vindicated by the judicial system. This Note coins the term
"hollow-rights legislation" to refer to laws such as the 1996 amendments that grant courts jurisdictional power to resolve disputes without conferring commensurate authority to satisfy the resulting
14

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (A).

15

See Vadnais, supra note 10, at 214.

16
17

See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981).

See Lee M. Caplan, The Constitution and Jurisdiction over Foreign States: The 1996
Amendment to the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act in Perspective,41 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (2001);

Ethan J. Early, Note, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran and the ForeignSovereign Immunities
Act: Is Peace of Mind Enough?, 14 CONN.J. INT'L L. 203 (1999); Richard T. Micco, Comment,
Puttingthe Terrorist-SponsoringState in the Dock: Recent Changes in the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act and the Individual'sRecourse Against ForeignPowers, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 109,

137-41 (2000) (arguing that claims brought under the 1996 amendments to the FSIA
should be litigated in the International Court ofJustice); Vadnais, supra note 10, at 221-22
(proposing that plaintiffs initially submit their claims to the executive branch before seeking a remedy in the courts).
18 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999).
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judgments. In addition to the FSIA, the two primary examples of
hollow-rights legislation are the Torture Victim Protection Act' 9 and
the Alien Tort Claims Act,20 both of which yield a substantial number

of judgments, of which almost none are satisfied.2 1 The controversy
surrounding Fatow demonstrates that the political forces that give
birth to such legislation preclude a simplistic solution such as the repeal of these ill-conceived laws. Indeed, Flatow and its progeny suggest
that any proposed solution to satisfying judgments under hollowrights laws must walk a tightrope between institutional politics and
individual justice. Cognizant of these limitations, this Note proposes a
blueprint for compromise between the federal government and prospective plaintiffs to resolve disputes arising under hollow-rights legislation. This blueprint strives to create a flexible framework for the
adjudication of rights by heightening the requirements for jurisdiction and giving the executive branch an incentive to remove obstacles
for worthy plaintiffs to satisfy their judgments.
This Note is particularly timely in light of recent events, because
in the aftermath of the World Trade Center disaster two developments are certain. First, a significant number of plaintiffs will sue
under the FSIA to recover compensatory and punitive damages from
nations proven to harbor and support the terrorists responsible for
the attack. Second, the same political conditions that led to the creation of the 1996 FSIA amendments will exert tremendous pressure on
Congress to pass additional hollow-rights laws to pacify victims of these
attacks. With an eye toward both of these trends, this Note proposes a
solution for past legislation while delivering an admonition for future
laws.
The Note accomplishes these objectives in four sections. Part I
sets forth and analyzes the history of the FSIA including the origins of
the 1996 amendments. Part II examines the specific roadblocks that
plaintiffs encounter by analyzing the postjudgment litigation in
Flatow. Part III discusses the significant forces that preclude Congress
and the President from fashioning meaningful reform under the current legislative scheme. Finally, Part IV proposes that Congress cure
the surrounding hollow judgments by amending the FSIA to condition jurisdiction on the prejudgment availability of an appropriate financial remedy.

19 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) ("The district courts shall have originaljurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.").
21 See Early, supra note 17, at 232.
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I
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES

Acr

For over one and a half centuries prior to the FSIA, United States
policy was to grant foreign countries absolute immunity from suit in
American courts. 22 While the judiciary recognized that the Constitution did not obligate the government to grant foreign countries this
privilege, 23 the United States voluntarily shielded foreign nations
from the jurisdiction of its domestic courts as a matter of diplomatic
courtesy. 24 Under this policy, federal courts deferred the question of
whether to exercise jurisdiction over foreign countries to the executive branch for an ad hoc determination of whether the country
should be subject to suit.2 5 For a long period of time it was unclear
exactly what criteria the executive branch employed when exercising
this discretion. In 1952, the executive branch finally revealed its
formula for determining whether to grant or withhold immunity in
the celebrated "Tate letter," which announced the adoption of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 26 The restrictive theory dictates that immunity is only available to foreign sovereigns for public
acts undertaken in the nation's political or diplomatic capacity, and
does not extend to the country's commercial or otherwise private
27
acts.
Although the Tate letter facially imposed a clear demarcation between the existence and absence of jurisdiction, foreign countries
used the "public act" loophole to pressure the executive branch to
grant immunity in cases that did not meet the requirements of the
restrictive theory.2 8 In some instances, the State Department responded to diplomatic pressure and refused to indicate whether a
court should exercise jurisdiction, leaving judges to address the issue
on their own. 29 Consequently, decisions on foreign sovereign immunity were often rendered simultaneously by two branches of government on the basis of vague criteria that were poorly understood and
30
not uniformly applied.
22 See Caplan, supra note 17, at 377.
23 See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
24 See id.
25
See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945); Ex parte Republic
of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-90 (1943).
26 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser for the Secretary of State, to Philip
B. Perlman, Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 app. 2, at 711 (1976).
27 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
28 Fredric Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning
and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 14-20 (1976).
29 Id. at 12-13.
30 Id. at 15-17.
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In an effort to defuse the case-by-case diplomatic pressure exerted on the executive branch and eliminate the ambiguity surrounding the exercise of foreign sovereign immunity, Congress passed the
FSIA in 1976.31 By incorporating the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity embodied within the Tate letter, the FSIA granted foreign
states immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts 32 subject
to certain exceptions.3 3 The three initial exceptions to immunity articulated in the FSIA governed the following: (1) cases in which foreign states expressly or impliedly waived their immunity, (2) injuries
arising from commercial activities conducted in the United States or
having a domestic effect, and (3) cases of tortious injury occurring
within the United States. 3 4 Significantly, Congress intended that these
provisions of the FSIA would provide the sole and exclusive basis for
jurisdiction over foreign states. As the Supreme Court ruled in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., "the text and structure of
the FSIA demonstrate Congress' intention that the FSIA be the sole
'35
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.
The FSIA underwent significant alterations in 1996, primarily in
response to several high-profile terrorist acts. On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996,36 which introduced two significant modifications
to the FSIA. First, the pre-1996 rule that foreign countries could only
be prosecuted for tortious acts committed within the territory of the
United States 37 was qualified by an exception from immunity for cases
"in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material
support or resources.., for such an act."38 Significantly, only countries formally designated by the State Department as state sponsors of
39
terrorism were amenable to suit under the 1996 amendments.
The second modification significantly expanded the right of
plaintiffs to attach the property of a foreign country to satisfy ajudgment under the FSIA. Prior to 1996, the FSIA imposed a strict in rem
nexus requirement by allowing plaintiffs to enforce judgments only
31

Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 2891, 2891-98 (1976) (codified as amended at

28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
32
33
34

35
36

37

28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).

Id. §§ 1605, 1607 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
Id. § 1605(a) (1), (a)(2), (a)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (5) (1994), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (5) (Supp. V

1999).
38
39

Id. § 1605(a) (7) (Supp. V 1999).
Id. § 1605(a) (7) (A).
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against the property out of which the claim arose. 40 Because the 1996
amendments expanded the jurisdiction of federal courts to encompass claims arising from alleged acts of torture and terrorism, prudential considerations compelled Congress to amend the FSIA's
execution provisions to allow quasi in rem attachment of any property
owned by the sovereign, regardless of whether the property was in41
volved in the act upon which the claim was based.
II
EFFORTS TO SATISFY THE JUDGMENT IN FLATOW

On April 9, 1995, Alisa Flatow, a United States citizen, was murdered when a suicide bomber drove a van loaded with explosives into
a bus traveling from Ashkelon, Israel to the Gaza Strip. 4 2 Her father,

Stephen Flatow, brought suit against the government of Iran in a federal district court claiming wrongful death, personal injury, and related torts under § 1605 (a) (7) of the FSIA. 43 Although Iran failed to
enter an appearance, Flatow proved that the Palestine Islamic Jihad,
which claimed responsibility for the bombing, received approximately
$2 million annually from the defendant. 44 The court ultimately concluded that the attack on the bus which inflicted fatal injuries to Alisa
Flatow "has been demonstrated by the testimony to have been part of
an extensive campaign of terror carried out to obtain the political
ends of the Islamic Republic of Iran," 45 and issued the plaintiff a default judgment for $20 million in compensatory damages and $225
46
million in punitive damages.
First, Flatow tried to attach a financial award that the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal ordered the United States to transfer to Iran for failing to fulfill its obligations under the Algiers Accords. 47 While Flatow
and the United States government litigated the validity of the writ on
the tribunal award, Flatow also attempted to satisfy his judgment by
seeking to attach three Iranian diplomatic properties that were released into the State Department's custody after the two countries terminated diplomatic relations on April 8, 1980. 4 8 Finally, Flatow

attempted to attach Iran's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Account,
40

Id. § 1610(a)(2) (1994).

41

Id. § 1610(a)(6)-(7) (Supp. V 1999).

42 Complaint at 4-5, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998)
(No. 97-396 (RCL)).
43 Id. at 2-3.
44
Id. at 6-7.
45 Fatow, 999 F. Supp. at 33.
46 See id. at 32, 34.
47 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 1999).
48 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999).
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purchases of military
which had been established to facilitate Iranian
49
vendors.
U.S.
from
services
and
equipment
Impediments to Execution Arising from Domestic and
International Law

A.

After the United States district court issued its judgment against
Iran, Flatow immediately focused his attention on satisfying his $245
million verdict. Not surprisingly, however, Flatow's avenues of attachment were limited due to Iran's minimal assets in the United States.
As Senators Connie Mack and Frank Lautenberg observed in a letter
to their colleagues in the Senate:
Several victims of terrorism have already found some measure
of justice through the [Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996].
However, none of the victims have been able to collect on the
judgements they hold against terrorist states because these rogue
nations tend to keep few, if any assets in the United States other
than those frozen by the Treasury Department under our sanctions
50
laws.
With few options available, Flatow predictably endeavored to execute his judgment by attaching the defendant's most visible assets
within the United States-Iran's embassies and diplomatic properties. 5 1 On July 7, 1998, the district court issued an order attaching
three diplomatic properties of Iran to satisfy Flatow's verdict. 52 In response to the court order, the United States attempted to quash the
writs of attachment, asserting that any attachment of Iran's diplomatic
properties would violate two domestic laws: the Foreign Missions Act
(FMA),53 and ironically, the FSIA-the statute that permitted the dis54
trict court to adjudicate Flatow's claim in the first place.
1.

The Foreign Missions Act

On April 7, 1980, President Carter severed diplomatic relations
with Iran and ordered all Iranian diplomatic and consular officials to
leave the United States. 5 5 To ensure the protection of Iran's assets
within the United States, President Carter directed the Secretary of
49
See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, C.A. No. 97-396 (RCL), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8910 (D.D.C. June 6, 2000).
50 Letter from Senators Connie Mack and Frank Lautenberg to Members of the Senate (Oct. 15, 1999) (on file with author).
51
Order to Issue Writs of Attachment on Judgment, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
52
Id.
53 22 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4316 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
54
See Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Flatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
55 Declaration of Patrick F. Kennedy 6, Flatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
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State to assume custody of Iran's diplomatic properties. 5 6 After Congress created the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) in 1982, the State
Department delegated its statutory responsibility to maintain and protect Iran's diplomatic properties to the OFM,5 7 an obligation that con58
tinues to this day.
In its motion to quash the writs of attachment on Iran's diplomatic properties, the United States referred the district court to
§ 4308(f) of the FMA, which explicitly grants mission property in the
custody of the State Department immunity from attachment: "Assets
of or under the control of the Department of State, wherever situated,
which are used by or held for the use of a foreign mission shall not be
subject to attachment, execution, injunction, or similar process,
whether intermediate or final. '59 In an effort to circumvent this
broad prohibition on attachment, Flatow argued that the State Department had misclassified the three properties as foreign missions
because the missions had lost their "diplomatic character" due to the
lengthy period of hostility between Iran and the United States, and
because the OFM was generating commercial profits by renting the
60
property to private parties.
Although Flatow's arguments were not facially meritless, he was
nonetheless unable to overcome the courts' longstanding practice of
according broad discretion to the State Department in its management and supervision of foreign missions under the FMA. Recognizing America's strong interest in preserving the integrity of foreign
missions, the D.C. Circuit has observed: "When exercising its supervisory function over foreign missions, the State Department acts at the
apex of its power. Because it has been accorded express authority
from Congress to act in this area, it wields the combined power of
61
both the executive and legislative branches."
Pursuant to this general dictate, federal courts have consistently
ruled that if the State Department designates property as a diplomatic
mission, the FMA provides immunity from attachment even if the
property is being used for commercial purposes at the time of judgment. Thus, in United States v. Central Corp. of Illinois, a district court
nullified the sale of two condominiums that had previously belonged
to the Iranian consulate in Chicago but were currently in the custody
56 See Diplomatic Relations with Iran, 1 PUB. PAPERS 612 (1980-81).
57 Under the FMA, the OFM is required to "protect and preserve" any property of a
foreign mission if that mission has ceased conducting diplomatic, consular, or other governmental activities in the United States. 22 U.S.C. § 4305(c)(1) (1994).
58 See Statement of Interest of the United States at 5, F/atow (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
59 22 U.S.C. § 4308(f) (1994).
60
See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to the Statement of Interest of the United
States at 18-22, Flatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
61 Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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of the United States. 62 The court held that although Iran was not
currently using the condominiums for a diplomatic purpose, the State
Department's designation of the properties as a foreign mission was
controlling: "Determinations as to the meaning and applicability of
the term foreign mission are committed to the discretion of the Secretary of State. The determination of the Secretary is reviewable by the
courts, but is given great deference. ' 63 Significantly, the Central Corp.
court also interpreted the FMA to preclude the foreign country's creditors from obtaining remuneration from the sale of diplomatic
properties: "Even if diplomatic relations have ceased, the Office of
Foreign Missions is to hold property of a foreign mission until the
Office determines it should sell the property and turn over the pro64
ceeds to the foreign country."
While the Flatow court found it unnecessary to reach the question
of whether the writs of attachment violated the FMA, 65 the trial judge
observed in a footnote that § 1610(a) (4) (B) of the FSIA reinforced
the provisions of the FMA by only permitting the attachment of property, "' [p]rovided... [t]hat such property is not used for purposes of
maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission or the residence of the
Chief of such mission.' 66 The district court's denial of Flatow's effort
to attach Iran's diplomatic properties makes it difficult to conceive of
any circumstances under which a plaintiff could successfully attach
diplomatic property. In the rare case when a designated "state sponsor of terrorism" actively conducts diplomatic relations from its embassies and consulates in the United States, a plaintiff would
nevertheless be prohibited from interfering with those activities by attaching the diplomatic properties while they are still in use.
Furthermore, Flatow illustrates that even after the President terminates diplomatic relations with a foreign country, federal courts will
defer to the OFM's discretion when determining whether embassy or
consulate property retains its "diplomatic character." Common sense
dictates that the OFM will utilize its discretion to maintain custody of
the diplomatic properties consistent with its delegated obligations
under the FMA, rather than willingly allow plaintiffs to attach the
properties in its charge. Finally, even if the OFM decides to sell a
country's diplomatic properties, the decision in Central Corp. demonstrates that the OFM is obliged to turn over the sale proceeds to the
67
foreign country that previously owned the property under the FMA.
In the end, the courts' interpretation of the FMA grants no recourse
62
63
64
65
66
67

Nov. 13, 1987).
No. 87 C 5072, 1987 WL 20129, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.

Fatow, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
Id. at 20 n.5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4)(B) (1994)).
See Cent. Corp., 1987 WL 20129, at *2.
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to plaintiffs attempting to satisfy a judgment by attaching diplomatic
property.
2.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Significantly, the execution provisions of the FSIA are structured
to permit the attachment of a foreign country's property as an exception to the general rule of immunity. According to § 1609 of the statute, "the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be
immune from attachment[,] arrest and execution except as provided
in sections 1610 and 1611."68 As noted earlier, the fact that Flatow's

judgment did not relate to a 'Judgment establishing rights in property," but rather was brought under the torture and terrorism provi69
sions of the FSIA significantly restricted his avenues of execution.
Nonetheless, the "commercial activity" exception of § 1610 did provide Flatow with one potential avenue for attachment: "The property
in the United States of a foreign state, .

.

. used for a commercial

activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment in
aid of execution ...."70
For Flatow to attach and execute the diplomatic properties belonging to Iran, however, he had the burden to show that the OFM's
management of the properties comprised "commercial activity" within
the meaning of § 1610. In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 7 1 the
Supreme Court established the parameters of the "commercial activities" exception:
[W] hen a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but
in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign's
actions are "commercial" within the meaning of the FSIA...
[T] he question is not whether the foreign government is acting with
a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions
that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them)
are the type of actions by which a private party engages in "trade and
72
traffic or commerce."
The Supreme Court's vague definition of "commercial activities"
impeded Flatow's attempts to classify the OFM's management of
Iran's diplomatic properties as a commercial activity, even though the
trial record indicated that the OFM was leasing the properties to unaf68

28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1994).

69 See, e.g., id. § 1610(a) (3)-(4) (1994) (allowing attachment when the judgment establishes rights in property and either: (1) the property is taken in violation of international law; (2) the property is acquired by succession or gift; or (3) the property is
immovable and situated in the United States).
70 Id. § 1610(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
71 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
72 Id. at 614 (emphasis in original).
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filiated third parties and earning significant profits from the enterprise. 7 3 In the aftermath of Weltover, however, courts were
understandably reluctant to undermine the OFM's authority to shield
diplomatic properties from writs of attachment that characterized its
property management as commercial. 7 4 In granting the United
States' motion to quash the writs of attachment in Flatow, the district
court concluded that custodial activities undertaken by the OFM are
inherently noncommercial in nature, as "the United States' taking
custody over a foreign state's properties and maintaining them is an
inherently sovereign [act], not a commercial ac."

75

The district court's decision is consistent with prior federal court
decisions narrowing the scope of the commercial activity exception to
protect the integrity of foreign mission property. In City of Englewood
v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiiya,76 the Third Circuit refined
the test for determining whether property satisfied the commercial
activity exception by requiring a "regular course of commercial
conduct":
The determinative issue is whether [the property in question] is currently being used in a "regular course of commercial conduct."
The only purpose Libya has in holding the property, so far as
this record discloses, is for use by the Chief of its Mission to the
United Nations. That is activity directly related to the purposes of
the mission, and as a matter of law such use is not commercial
activity.

77

Applying the new definition, the court ruled that Libya's act of
purchasing property on the open market did not waive immunity
from attachment under the commercial activity exception. 78 Similarly, in United States v. County of Arlington, the Fourth Circuit voided
73 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to the Statement of Interest of the United
States at 26, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 97396 (RCL)).
74
See, e.g., United States v. County of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 934 (4th Cir. 1982).
The court explained:
Neither the [FSIA] nor its legislative history specifies what property is
or is not "used for purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission." The views of the [State] Department concerning the scope of this
phrase, though not conclusive, are entitled to great weight... It has expertise for determining whether property is used for maintaining a mission.
Only if its views are manifestly unreasonable should they be rejected.
Id.
75
Flatow, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 23. The district court continued: "Put simply, although
leasing of property by a private party might be commercial in nature, taking custody over
diplomatic property under the authority granted by a federal statute or treaty is decidedly
sovereign in nature. Indeed, such 'power[ ] [is] peculiar to sovereigns.'" Id.(alterations
in original).
76
773 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1985).
77
Id. at 37.
78
Id.
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all assessments and liens on an apartment building owned by the German government after ruling that the building was exempt from
county taxes because it was not operated as a for-profit commercial
venture. 79 The court took judicial notice of the House Report accompanying the FSIA, which demonstrated Congress's general intent to
exempt diplomatic properties from the commercial activities excep-

tion of § 1610:
"[Section 1610(a)(4)] would deny immunity from execution against
property of a foreign state which is used for a commercial activity in
the United States and is either acquired by succession or gift or is
immovable. Specifically exempted are diplomatic and consular missions and the residence of the chiefs of such missions. This exemption applies to all of the situations encompassed by section[ ]
1610(a) . . . . [E]mbassies and related buildings could not be

deemed to be property used for a 'commercial' activity as required
80
by section 1610(a)."
In addition to the court's reluctance to classify the OFM's supervision of diplomatic properties as commercial activity, Flatow was hardpressed to demonstrate that the Supreme Court's definition of commercial activity in Weltover could be satisfied when the foreign country
that owned the property did not control its day-to-day management.
The Weltover Court emphasized that "when a foreign government acts,
not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player
within it, the foreign sovereign's actions are 'commercial' within the
meaning of the FSIA."8 1 When the property of a state sponsor of terrorism reverts to State Department control following the termination
of diplomatic relations, it is impossible for that foreign country to
manifest intent to commercially use the property. Under these circumstances, the Flatow court was unwilling to expand the commercial
activity exception to trigger an exception on the basis of a third party's
management of the property. As the court explained:
[I]f the FSIA could be applied to foreign state property that is being
used by a non-agent third party, it would expand the class of cases
arising under the Act beyond those limited, enumerated exceptions
to immunity prescribed by Congress, and thus would expose foreign
states to far greater liability than was originally contemplated under
82

the Act.

79
80

669 F.2d at 934-35.
Id. at 933 (first and last alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at

29 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6628).
81 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)
added).
82 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 1999).

(emphasis
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The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

Flatow's effort to enforce writs of attachment against Iran's diplomatic properties not only illustrates the tension between the FSIA's
execution provisions and other domestic laws, but also its potential
conflicts with international law. In particular, the United States argued that attachment of Iran's former embassies and consulates
would violate the United States' obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR).83 Ratified by the United
States in 1972, the primary function of the VCDR8 4 is to facilitate effective diplomatic interaction in the international community by pro85
viding for the integrity and security of embassies and consulates.
The provision of the VCDR most pertinent to the Flatow litigation was
Article 45 (a), which expressly requires each nation to protect the diplomatic property of foreign states during periods of diplomatic hostility: "If diplomatic relations are broken off between two States... (a)
the receiving State must, even in case of armed conflict, respect and
protect the premises of the mission, together with its property and
"..
,86
archives ..
Accordingly, the United States argued that the district court must
quash the writ of attachment on Iran's diplomatic properties, which
both parties conceded were part of the Iranian embassy within the
meaning of the VCDR.8 7 Flatow attempted to sidestep this unfavorable Article 45 (a) language by arguing that the United States no longer
owed a duty to protect Iran's diplomatic properties under the
VCDR.88 On November 4, 1979, Iran committed what Flatow characterized as "the most heinous violation of reciprocal diplomatic obligations in modern history" by seizing the American Embassy in Tehran
and holding fifty-two American diplomats hostage for 444 days.8 9
Therefore, under governing principles of international law,90 the
83
84

See Statement of Interest of the United States at 13-14, Fatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,

500 U.N.T.S. 95.
85 See id.
86 Id. art. 45(a), 23 U.S.T. at 3248, 500 U.N.T.S. at 122.
87 Of the three pieces of property in dispute, one was the former residence of the
ambassador and the other two were residences of other high-ranking Iranian diplomats.

See Statement of Interest of the United States at 13-14, Fatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)). Under
the VCDR, an ambassador's residence is explicitly considered part of the embassy premises, and the treaty accords other diplomatic residences the same status and protection as
the embassy itself. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 84, arts.
1(i), 30, 23 U.S.T. at 3231, 3240, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98, 110.
88 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to the Statement of Interest of the United
States at 4, Fatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
89
90

Id.

SeeVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adoptedMay 23, 1969, art. 60(2) (b),
S. ExEc. Doe. No. L, 92-1, at 11, 27 (1971), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 346; RESTATEMENT (THImD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 335(2) (b) (1986).
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United States could (and should) respond to Iran's breach by suspending its treaty obligations to Iran. Consequently, Flatow asserted
that enforcement of the writs of attachment on Iran's diplomatic
properties would be consistent with international law.91
In response, the United States convincingly argued that the
VCDR anticipates the possibility of a material breach and specifically
provides for the continuing enforcement of the treaty's provisions in
Article 45(a), which confers precise obligations on the host country
when controversial events cause the termination of diplomatic relations. 92 Under the government's theory, President Carter's decision
to suspend diplomatic relations with Iran did not extinguish
America's obligations under the VCDR, but instead triggered its particular obligation to protect and maintain Iran's diplomatic properties
9
under Article 45(a). 3

More significantly, the government also asserted that the district
court has no constitutional authority to declare that the United States
was authorized to disregard its obligations under the VCDR in response to Iran's alleged material breach. 9 4 This position has significant support. As the Supreme Court articulated in United States v.
Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.,95 the executive branch has the sole discretion to determine whether the United States remains bound to a multilateral treaty:
"The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution .... The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate .... "
The marked difference between foreign affairs and domestic
affairs in this respect is recognized by both houses of Congress
96

Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations observes that the
exclusive authority to declare the existence of a material breach and
to administer the United States' response is entrusted to the executive
branch. 97 Accordingly, the role of the federal judiciary with respect to
91 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to the Statement of Interest of the United
States at 5-6, Flatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
92 See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash at 19-20, Fatow (No. 97396 (RCL)).
93
See Statement of Interest of the United States at 13-14, Fatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
94 See Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash at 21, Fatow (No. 97-396

(RCL)).
95 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
96 Id. at 320-21 (quoting Letter from George Washington to the House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1976), in 1 JAMEs D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1798-1908, at 194, 194-95 (1908)).
97
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 335
cmt. b (1986).
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international treaties is simply to interpret them according to their
terms unless they violate the Constitution. 9
Although the district court did not predicate its decision to quash
the writs of attachment on Article 45(a) of the VCDR, the looming
conflict between the execution provisions of the FSIA and the United
States' international obligations provokes troubling questions for
plaintiffs like Flatow. Independent of the normative significance of
the United States' ratification of the VCDR, there are important prudential considerations that militate against allowing plaintiffs to attach
the properties of foreign countries that are expressly protected under
multilateral treaties. First, a permissive approach to enforcing writs of
attachment could provoke retaliation against American diplomatic
properties overseas. As the government observed during the postjudgment phase of the Flatow litigation:
In order effectively to hold other countries to their obligations
under the VCDR, the United States must adhere to its own obligations. Allowing the attachment of the diplomatic property at issue
in this case could set a precedent, jeopardizing the ability of the
United States to protect its missions abroad from similar acts by foreign governments. 99
Allowing plaintiffs to attach diplomatic properties in violation of
international law also threatens to discourage state sponsors of terrorism from resuming normal diplomatic relations with the United
States. In Flatow, the government argued that "deprivation of an embassy at the behest of a private litigant ... could encourage a judgment debtor state to break off... diplomatic relations with the United
States. Such a foreseeable consequence.. . would seriously impinge
on the President's diplomatic authority."'10 0 The government's contention was particularly germane to Flatow's verdict against Iran; after
the U.S. embassy hostage crisis in Iran in 1981, the United States and
Iran signed the Algiers Accords, a bilateral treaty that created a tribunal in which nationals of one country could bring claims against the
98

The Supreme Court agrees:

The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority, and the
courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions,
unless they violate the Constitution of the United States. It is their duty to
interpret it and administer it according to its terms.
Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853).
99 Statement of Interest of the United States at 15, Flatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)); see also
The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act: Hearingon S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Admin.
Practice of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 103d Cong. 15 (1994) (prepared statement of
Jamison S. Borek) ("In cases involving deliberate governmental wrongdoing, moreover,
domestic measures directed against state property could involve particular sensitivity, given
the potential for retaliation and disruption of relations.").
100 United States' Post-Hearing Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities
at 16, Flatow (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
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government of the other country for arbitration. 10 1 Under the terms
of the Algiers Accords, decisions of the tribunal are binding on Iran
and the United States, and tribunal awards are enforceable in the
10 2
courts of either country.
Given both countries' efforts to repair their diplomatic relationship following the Iran hostage crisis, judicial enforcement of writs of
attachment against Iranian property might be perceived as an unwarranted act of hostility and meddling that could unravel the Algiers
Accords and discourage other hostile nations from making diplomatic
overtures to the United States. Under such circumstances, it is not at
all surprising that the VCDR has been interpreted to deprive domestic
plaintiffs of their opportunity to satisfy judgments under the FSIA.
B. The Barrier of Executive Discretion
Notwithstanding the roadblocks presented by domestic law and
the United States' treaty obligations, the most daunting obstacle to
the satisfaction of judgments under the FSIA is the President's discretion to waive the FSIA's immunity exceptions. The FSIA empowers
the President to waive a plaintiffs right to attach foreign assets, even
when doing so presents no conflict with domestic or international law.
The legislative and judicial branches are understandably reluctant to
interfere with the President's authority to use the domestic resources
of state sponsors of terrorism as a "bargaining chip" in diplomatic
negotiations.

1.

03

Blocked Assets

Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA),104 the President is empowered to "compel, nullify, .

.

. or

prohibit, any... transfer... with respect to, or transactions involving,
any property" subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in which
any foreign country has any interest. 0 5 On November 14, 1979, President Carter invoked his IEEPA powers to declare a national emergency after concluding that the policies and actions of the Iranian
government created an "unusual and extraordinary threat to the na101 See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-Iran,
DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1981, at 3 [hereinafter Algiers Accords].
102 Id. art. IV, DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1981, at 4.
103
See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673-74 (1981).
104
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
105
Id. § 1702 (a) (1) (B) (1994). Under the IEEPA, the President's authority "may be
exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole
or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect
to such threat." Id. § 1701 (a).
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10 6
tional security, foreign policy and economy of the United States."
President Carter's executive order blocked all property and interests
in property of the Iranian government that were within the United
States at the time, and that subsequently came within the jurisdiction
of the United States. 10 7 Significantly, every American president has
renewed this executive order since 1979.108 After issuing the executive order, President Carter authorized the Treasury Department to
implement regulations that nullified and voided any "attachment,
judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process" 10 9 with respect to property of Iran, and provided that "licenses
[or] authorizations" bestowing rights to Iranian property could be
"amended modified, or revoked at any time."" 0
The practical significance of a blocking order is that the courts
perceive it as a strong signal of the President's intent to exert federal
control over a foreign state's property. Recognizing Congress's transfer of authority to the President under the IEEPA, courts have traditionally held that presidential decisions nullifying attachments on
property are "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."11 The power of this
judicial presumption is augmented by the federaljudiciary's expansive
reading of the IEEPA as superseding all individual interests in foreign
assets without limitation.' 1 2 Consequently, courts are unsympathetic
to plaintiffs who argue that Congress did not intend the IEEPA to
preempt their attempts to satisfy judgments through writs of attachment on blocked properties. The Supreme Court emphatically rejected this argument in Dames & Moore v. Regan:

106

Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R 457 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note

(1994).
107

See id.

Most recently, President Bush renewed the order in November 2001. See Continuation of Iran Emergency, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,966 (Nov. 13, 2001).
109 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (2001).
110 Id. § 501.803.
108

111 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
112 See Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 807
(1st Cir. 1981). The court explained:
[Appellee] argues that IEEPA does not supply the President with

power to override judicial remedies, such as attachments and injunctions,
or to extinguish "interests" in foreign assets held by United States citizens.
But we can find no such limitation in IEEPA's terms. The language of
IEEPA is sweeping and unqualified. It provides broadly that the President

may void or nullify the "exercising [by any person of] any right, power or
privilege with respect to... any property in which any foreign country has
any interest .... "
Id. (emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a) (1) (B)).
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This Court has previously recognized that the congressional
purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of foreign
assets in the hands of the President .... " Such orders permit the
President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in
negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The
frozen assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be used by the President
when dealing with a hostile country. Accordingly, it is difficult to
accept petitioner's argument because the practical effect of it is to
allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or
wholly eliminate this "bargaining chip" through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports
1 13
such a result.
In light of this precedent, courts predictably interpret the FSIA's
execution provisions to relegate plaintiffs' claims to a subservient status relative to the federal government's interests. As the Dames &
Moore Court elaborated:
Petitioner... asserts that Congress divested the President of
the authority to settle claims when it enacted the [FSIA]....
We disagree....
... The FSIA was thus designed to remove one particular barrier to suit, namely sovereign immunity, and cannot be fairly read as
prohibitingthe President from settling claims of United States na11 4
tionals against foreign governments.
Frustrated by the judicial presumption that the IEEPA universally
trumps plaintiffs' FSIA rights, Congress amended the FSIA during the
Flatow litigation to grant plaintiffs a statutory right to attach foreign
assets blocked by the executive branch. The newly created
§ 1610(f) (1) (A) of the FSIA was passed as a rider provision to the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
of 1999, and provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including but not
limited to section 208(f) of the Foreign Missions Act, and except as
provided in subparagraph (B), any property with respect to which
financial transactions are prohibited or regulated pursuant to section 5(b) of the Trading with. the Enemy Act, section 620(a) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, sections 202 and 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or any other proclamation
... shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution
of any judgment relating to a claim for which a foreign state ...
claiming such property is not immune under section 1605 (a) (7).115
113 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673-74 (1981) (citation omitted).
114 Id. at 684-85 (emphasis in original).
115 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, division A, sec. 101(h), tit. 1, sec. 117(a), § 1610(f) (1) (A), 112 Star.

2002]

CONFRONTING "HOLLOW-RIGHTS LEGISLATION"

1021

Despite this effort, however, Congress was unwilling to fully divest
the executive branch of its discretion originally granted by the IEEPA.
Thus, the legislature felt compelled to also include an executive
waiver provision that grants the President the authority to waive this
exception to immunity from attachment "in the interest of national
security." 116 In practical terms, this provision completely eviscerated
the pro-plaintiff provisions in the amended FSIA: the amended FSIA
altered the status quo only insofar as the President was required to
take the affirmative step of invoking the executive waiver to thwart
plaintiffs' efforts to attach blocked assets. 1 7 Predictably, on the same
day that President Clinton signed the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 into law, he formally exercised the waiver provision to waive the rights of plaintiffs to
8
attach blocked assets under the new legislation."1
Caught in the middle of this legislative and executive wrangling
was Stephen Flatow, who in the meantime was attempting to satisfy his
judgment by obtaining a writ to attach Iran's Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) accounts, and all related accounts. 119 Originally created by the
Arms Export Control Act,' 20 the FMS program established sales accounts for foreign countries authorized to purchase military products
and services from the United States Department of Defense. 121 Funds
received from eligible countries are deposited into their FMS accounts, and the Secretary of Treasury withdraws funds from the relevant account after transferring arms or military services to the
122
participating country.
When President Carter froze Iran's FMS account assets pursuant
to his executive order on November 4, 1979,123 there was a $400 mil2681, 2681-491 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1999)) (citations
omitted).
116 Id. sec. 117(d), 112 Stat. at 2681-492, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note (Supp. V
1999) (Waiver of Exception to Immunity from Attachment or Execution).
117 See S. Jason Baletsa, Comment, The Cost of Closure: A Reexamination of the Theoy and
Practiceof the 1996 Amendments to the ForeignSovereign ImmunitiesAct 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1247,
1294-95 (2000) ("It is axiomatic that the attachment of property of a designated state
sponsor of terrorism will always threaten national security... If such a nation were not a
threat to national security, it would not have been so designated as a terrorist state.").
118 Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,201 (Nov. 2, 1998), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610 note (Supp. V 1999). President Clinton justified his decision to exercise the executive waiver by stating that: "Ihereby determine that the requirements of section 117...
would impede the ability of the President to conduct foreign policy in the interest of national security and would, in particular, impede the effectiveness of such prohibitions and
regulations upon financial transactions .... " Id.
119 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, C.A. No. 97-396 (RCL), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8910 (D.D.C. June 6, 2000).
120 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799aa-2 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
121
Fatow, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8910, at * 4.
122 Id.
123 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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lion balance in the account 1 24 After Flatow's earlier writ of attachment for "'all credits held by the United States to the benefit of
[Iran],' including U.S. Treasury funds owed to Iran in accordance
with an award of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal" was quashed
by the district court on grounds of sovereign immunity, 125 he made a
final attempt to satisfy his judgment by filing another writ of attachment for these FMS funds.1 26 However, the court invoked its prior
ruling to foreclose this avenue of execution as well, ruling that sover27
eign immunity similarly barred the attachment of the FMS funds.'
The United States had initially raised the defense of sovereign
immunity in litigating the viability of Flatow's writ to attach blocked
assets in the United States Treasury (i.e., the tribunal award). 128 Specifically, the government had asserted that in light of President Clinton's exercise of the executive waiver, the court could not have
enforced Flatow's writ on Iran's tribunal award absent an explicit
waiver of sovereign immunity authorizing the attachment of funds in
the United States Treasury. 129 As the federal district court observed,
however, Congress can only waive the sovereign immunity of the
United States through unambiguous statutory language, and not by
implication. 130 Citing a Seventh Circuit opinion, the court noted that
"'the principle of governmental immunity is simple: anyone who seeks
'131
money from the Treasury needs a statute authorizing that relief.""
Without explicit consent, "' [i] t is axiomatic that the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents a judgment creditor from attaching federal
property. '"'132 Indeed, the United States pointed to the Supreme
Court's observation in Lane v. Pena that "[a] waiver of the Federal
Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed
in statutory text and will not be implied. Moreover, a waiver of the
Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms
133
of its scope, in favor of the sovereign."'
Flatow, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8910, at *5-*6.
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20-26 (D.D.C. 1999).
126 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, C.A. No. 97-396 (RCL), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8910, at *3-*4 (D.D.C. June 6, 2000).
127
Id. at *6-*9.
128 Flatow, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
129 See Reply Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion to Quash Writ
of Attachment and Expedited Disposition at 3-5, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F.
Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 97-396 (RCL)).
130 Flatow, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
131 Id. (quoting Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Darla Envtl. Specialists, 53 F.3d 181, 182
(7th Cir. 1995)).
132 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Neukirchen v. Wood County Head Start, Inc.,
53 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1995)).
133 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citations omitted); accord United States v. Williams, 514
U.S. 527, 531 (1995); United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992) ("[T]he
124
125
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As recently as 1999, the Supreme Court reinforced these principles in Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.: "[O] ur precedent establish[es] that sovereign immunity bars creditors from attaching or
garnishing funds in the Treasury or enforcing liens against property
owned by the United States,"' 34 holding that the "respondent's action
to enforce an equitable lien falls outside of [the statutory] waiver of
sovereign immunity." 3 5 Ultimately the district court had agreed, ruling to quash the writ of attachment on the block assets within the
United States Treasury, observing:
[I] t is undisputed that the funds plaintiff seeks to attach are held in
the U.S. Treasury.... Thus, controlling authority requires this
Court to find that the Treasury funds at issue here are U.S. property
and that the writ of attachment constitutes a suit against the United
13 6
States, which is barred by sovereign immunity.
2.

The Algiers Accords

As noted above, the Algiers Accords established the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal in which the nationals of one country can bring
1 7
claims against the government of the other country for arbitration. 3
Under its terms, decisions of the tribunal are binding, and awards are
enforceable in the courts of either country. 3 8 In February 1993, Iran
sued the United States in the tribunal claiming that it violated the
Algiers Accords when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in IranAir
40
Industries v. Avco Corp.,139 did not enforce a prior tribunal award.'
After conducting a trial, the tribunal ruled in favor of Iran and
41
awarded it $5,042,481.65 in damages.'
After receiving notice of the pending judgment against the
United States, Flatow attempted to attach these damage payments
owed by the United States to satisfy his own judgment. 142 Citing
§ 1610(f) (1) (A) of the FSIA, Flatow argued that the award of the IranU.S. Claims Tribunal constituted property belonging to Iran under
the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 14 3 and was thus subject to at'unequivocal expression' of elimination of sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an
expression in statutory text."); Lehman v. Nakshain, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981).
134 525 U.S. 255, 264 (1999) (citation omitted).
135 Id. at 263.
136 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 1999).
137
138

See Algiers Accords, supra note 101.
Id. art IV, DEP'T ST. BULL, Feb. 1981, at 4.

980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992).
See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A/27, Award No. 586-A27-Fr
(Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., June 5, 1998), available at 1998 WL 1157733.
141 Id. para. 83(b).
142 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20 (D.D.C. 1999).
143 31 C.F.R. § 535.311 (2001).
139

140

1024

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1001

tachment under the newly amended FSIA. 14 4 After President Clinton
waived the exception to immunity for blocked assets, however, the
government argued that the plaintiff could not legally attach the tribunal award. The United States' theory was that the funds which the
United States was ordered to pay to Iran technically were held in the
Treasury until the actual transfer to Iran, giving the United States a
possessory interest in the funds. 14 5 As the Supreme Court stated in
Buchanan v. Alexander "So long as money remains in the hands of a
disbursing officer, it is as much the money of the United States, as if it
had not been drawn from the treasury."'146 Significantly, the D.C.
Court of Appeals reiterated in Arizona v. Bowsher that " [w] hen the
United States sets aside money for the payment of specific debts, it
does not thereby lose its property interest in that money."' 47 Therefore, absent a specific waiver of sovereign immunity, the Flatow court
was powerless to enforce its writ of attachment on the judgment of the
Claims Tribunal. 148 In the end, Flatow's inability to identify a valid
waiver of sovereign immunity doomed his efforts to attach both Iran's
FMS account and the judgment of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
Flatow's futile effort to circumvent President Clinton's executive
waiver illustrates the impotence of Congress's modifications to the attachment provisions of the FSIA. The President's authority to assert
dominion over monies owed to foreign governments that are held in
the United States Treasury leaves no avenue for plaintiffs to enforce
writs of attachment. Funds held in the Treasury pending transfer are
unattachable as a matter of law because FSIA plaintiffs cannot identify
a legally cognizable waiver of sovereign immunity that would authorize attachment. Furthermore, once the funds are officially transferred, plaintiffs have no recourse to satisfy their judgments under the
laws of the foreign sovereign. Thus the Catch-22 imposed by the executive waiver provision completely forecloses plaintiffs from obtaining
relief unless the President willingly forgoes the waiver privilege
granted by the statute. As discussed below, however, strong incentives
exist for the President to invoke the executive waiver provision rather
than allow plaintiffs to attach foreign assets.
III
ENTRENCHMENT OF THE STATUS QUO

As demonstrated above, the infirmities of hollow-rights legislation
derive from the nature of their goal: to remedy noncommercial inju144
145
146
147
148

See Flatow, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
See id. at 22-23.
45 U.S. (4 How.) 20, 20-21 (1846).
935 F.2d 332, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
See Flatow, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 22.
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ries that implicate foreign actors. A fundamental component of this
Note's blueprint for modifying the FSIA and other hollow-rights laws
is the inability of Congress and the President to reform the execution
and attachment process given the tradition of judicial deference to
those two branches in the sphere of international relations. Indeed,
the statutory modifications proposed in Part IV would be unnecessary
if any one of three initiatives were implemented to resolve the difficulties of satisfying verdicts under the 1996 amendments. First, plaintiffs
could voluntarily agree to settle their judgments through a no-fault
compensation scheme administered by the executive branch. Second,
Congress could eliminate the incidence of unsatisfiable judgments by
decisively acting to either repeal the grant of jurisdiction in the 1996
amendments, or remove the President's discretion to waive the exception to immunity for blocked assets. Finally, in the absence of cooperation from either plaintiffs or Congress, the President could
voluntarily agree to forgo the exercise of the waiver provision.
However, the fallout from the Flatow case demonstrates that none
of these solutions are tenable for all litigants. Stephen Flatow and the
federal government's failure to reach a cooperative equilibrium under
the current statutory scheme signals the need for legislative change. A
precise understanding of the individual and institutional forces that
preclude implementation of these three initiatives is critical to understanding the inherent limitations of hollow-rights legislation, and
frames the context for the reforms proposed in Part IV.
A.

Plaintiffs Will Not Voluntarily Settle Their Judgments with
the United States Government

In the aftermath of the President's decision to invoke the executive waiver provision, rumors circulated that the executive branch had
offered Flatow a settlement according to which the President would
finance a portion of Flatow's judgment from a victim's compensation
fund administered by the Justice Department. 149 According to the Legal Times- "[T] he [A] dministration has offered to pay part of Flatow's
judgment, possibly from the Justice Department's victims' rights or
judgment funds.... Flatow has refused the offer because it would not
'serve as a deterrent against future conduct' by the Iranians.''15°
Flatow's refusal to accept a partial settlement financed by American taxpayers reflects the undesirability of compromise solutions engineered by the executive branch that leave the resources of the
defendant country intact. Plaintiffs who have lost loved ones to terrorist acts, suffered the agony of a trial, and done battle with their own
149

3.

150

Carrie Johnson, Victim's Father, White House at Odds,LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1999, at
Id.
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President are unlikely to agree to a settlement at the eleventh hour
simply to guarantee themselves some measure of financial compensation for their loss. Rather, plaintiffs have substantial motivation to
fight for the day when the financial impact of satisfying ajudgment in
the hundreds of millions of dollars inflicts on the defendant country
adequate retribution for the act that created the cause of action and
deters it from funding similar acts of terrorism in the future. 5 1 As
one Senator remarked:
The Treasury Department has suggested using the Crime Victims Fund to satisfy these court judgments, but that proposal misses
the point. Foreign countries that sponsor terrorism should have to
pay a price for the toll that terrorist attacks take on families like the
Flatows .... Making terrorist states pay that price will help deter
15 2
them from engaging in terrorism in the future.
The existence and depth of these sentiments impose an important
constraint on meaningful reform by eliminating any proposal that relies on the financial resources of the executive branch to placate
plaintiffs under the FSIA. Ignoring these concerns, Congress passed
the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA) in
October 2000,15 3 which offers incentives for plaintiffs with judgments
to forgo punitive damages and attachment of foreign property in return for the satisfaction of their compensatory claims by the United
154
States government.
Indeed, Congress sought to reconcile the seemingly incompatible
objectives of compensation and retribution by incorporating a subrogation clause into the VTVPA that holds Iran liable for any funds paid
in satisfaction of outstanding judgments against it.155 In this manner
Congress hoped to have it both ways by immediately compensating
plaintiffs out of the United States Treasury, while offering ironclad
assurances that Iran would be pressured to reimburse the United
States for these payments. In fact, the language of the VTVPA goes so
far as to stake the United States' diplomatic relationship with Iran on
the repayment of these damage awards: "It is the sense of the Congress that the President should not normalize relations between the
151 See Micco, supra note 17, at 142 (stating that "[tihe primary goal of... plaintiffs is
to have a court render.., a judgment publicly with the prospect of inflicting financial
retribution upon the offending state and its agent").
152
Terrorism Hearing,supra note 13, at 16 (statement of Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg).
153 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§ 2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 1541-43, amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1610 note (1994 & Supp. V
1999).
154
See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to International
Law, 95 Am.J. INT'L L. 132, 137-39 (2001).

155

1543.

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, § 2002(c), 114 Stat. at
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United States and Iran until the claims subrogated have been dealt
156
with to the satisfaction of the United States."
B.

Congress Will Neither Remove nor Guarantee the Rights of
Plaintiffs to Execute Judgments Under the FSIA

In the effort to combat terrorist attacks against American citizens
overseas, one might naturally assume that Congress and the President
would have incentives to cooperate in order to present a unified
stance against state sponsors of terrorism. Significantly, the events following the district court's judgment in Flatow starkly illustrate the conflicting institutional forces that have driven a rift between the
legislative and executive branches over how to deter extraterritorial
acts of terrorism against American citizens. These forces predominantly result from the substantially different roles played by Congress
and the President in the democratic system. As political scholarJames
Q. Wilson points out, the elected representatives in Congress are primarily concerned with advocating the interests of their constituents.' 57 Furthermore, Wilson observes that most voters who compose
a senator or representative's constituency are concerned with the
"here and now": "What happens now or in the near future is more
58
important to most people than what happens in the distant future."'
Therefore, Congress's legislative approach to deterring acts of terrorism, as articulated in the 1996 FSIA amendments, understandably
seeks to deter, and yet to compensate individual victims of terrorism
and their families with substantial judicial verdicts rendered and satisfied in an efficient manner.
In contrast, as the representative of a single national constituency, the President is more insulated from individual concerns, and
thus more likely to seek a solution to terrorism that does not vindicate
the interests of one particular plaintiff at the expense of other American terrorist victims and the public interest. Furthermore, as the constitutionally delegated head of state, the President is more inclined to
seek solutions to terrorism through diplomacy and negotiation than
through an expansion ofjurisdiction to hear claims arising from acts
of terrorism committed overseas.
The collision of these institutional forces has been exacerbated
by the 1996 FSIA amendments for two reasons. First, the conflict between the President and Congress occurs within the confines of a
strict zero-sum game. The scant availability of resources owned by
156
157

Id. § 2002(d), 114 Stat. at 1543.
Q. WILsoN, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 281 (4th ed. 1989) ("The way by which

JAMEs

people get elected to Congress .... produces legislators who are closely tied to local
concerns . . ").
158 Id. at 443.
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state sponsors of terrorism forces the federal government to choose
between satisfying substantial plaintiff verdicts, and using foreignowned property as a bargaining tool in negotiations. Second, Congress has tempered its populist approach to deterring terrorism by
endowing the executive branch with the discretion to override individual plaintiff interests in times of national emergency.
As discussed earlier, the resulting tug-of-war between Congress
and the President could potentially be resolved in one of three ways.
First, Congress could on its own initiative repeal the grant ofjurisdiction under the 1996 amendments. Second, Congress could remove
the President's discretion to void writs of attachment on blocked assets by repealing the executive waiver provision or explicitly waiving
the United States' sovereign immunity. Finally, the President could
voluntarily forbear from exercising his statutory authority to invoke
the executive waiver provision.
1.

Congress Will Not Repeal the Grant ofJurisdiction Under the
1996 Amendments

When Congress introduced the 1996 amendments to the FSIA in
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the rhetoric surrounding the amendments signaled the legislature's intent to
place a prohibitive price tag on targeting American citizens for violent
acts overseas. As New Jersey Congressman Jim Saxton argued:
Terrorists operate around this world, and there is seldom a price to
pay. I thought in 1996, when we passed this law, we took a step in
the right direction ....
This is a tool for us to use as a civilized
society to prevent acts of terrorism by letting would-be terrorists
159
know that there is a price to pay.
However, by couching the 1996 amendments as a necessary step in the
process of curbing terrorism, Congress left itself with no political recourse for repealing the legislation in the event that plaintiffs were
unable to satisfy their judgments under the FSIA. Not only would it
be difficult to repeal the legislation in a way that would be palatable to
the American public, but Congress also has no incentive to do so because legislators have successfully deflected the blame for the rash of
unsatisfied judgments to the executive branch. As a New York Congressman exclaimed while excoriating the White House:
[T] he Flatow family has gotten a judgment against the government
of Iran, which sponsors terrorism. It is absolutely obscene that we
would be in a position of taking the side of Iran....

159

144 CONG. REc. H5712 (daily ed. July 16, 1998) (statement of Rep. Saxton).
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It is ludicrous that the State Department had opposed [the attachment of Iranian assets]. Iran must pay a price for the continu160
ing support of terrorism.
Indeed, in a public relations victory for Congress, Flatow himself publicly criticized President Clinton for waiving the exception to immunity for blocked assets: "'If President Clinton wants me to trust that his
administration is tough on terrorists... [his] action is not the way to
get there from here .... 161
2.

Congress Will Not Remove the President'sDiscretion to Waive the
Exception for Immunity

While Congress is unlikely to repeal the grant of jurisdiction
under the 1996 amendments, it is similarly reluctant to eliminate the
President's discretion to waive the rights of plaintiffs to blocked assets.
A sentiment frequently expressed in the wake of the September 11,
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center is that the President should
have the authority to transfer foreign assets back to state sponsors of
terrorism in exchange for a guarantee not to target American citizens,
or in exchange for intelligence on terrorist networks in neighboring
countries. Some senators and representatives recognized that the removal of all barriers to the attachment and execution of foreign assets
would not only leave the President with no leverage to negotiate with
foreign countries, but could provoke retaliation against American assets overseas. The cumulative weight of these arguments will likely
scuttle proposals for an absolute removal of the President's discretion.
As one Senator observed in 1999:
[W]hen you deal with these terrorist countries, whoever they are,
and as much hatred as we develop for them, for the acts that they
have committed against innocent people, we do have to trust in
some form a government's judgment in how you resolve conflict

...
[A] s much as I despise things that are going on in Iran, I
would rather have them stop making atomic and nuclear weapons
and join the family of civilized nations. So if there is a bargaining
162
chip that can be used, we have to decide how the chip is played.

Citing specific examples of successful presidential negotiations,
other Congressmen have been more outspoken when opposing legislation that would deprive the President of instrumental assets that
bring hostile countries to the bargaining table:
160 Id. at H7267 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. Engel).
161 Terror Victim's Kin Criticizes Clinton Waiver, WASH. PosT, Oct. 26, 1998, at A15 (first
two alterations in original).
162
Terrorism Hearing,supra note 13, at 19 (statement of Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg).
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[T] his amendment would substantially undermine the President's
ability to use such assets as leverage when economic sanctions are
being used to modify the behavior of a foreign state or in negotiations with that state. It said, for instance, that if private claims were
allowed to execute judgments ahead of these assets, the President
would be deprived of their use as leverage to gain concessions from
[foreign states] in the negotiating process .... 163
In the final analysis, the self-imposed limbo caused by Congress's
unwillingness to either remove courts' authority to adjudicate claims
arising from terrorist acts occurring overseas, or to remove all obstacles to the attachment and execution of assets belonging to state sponsors of terrorism, places additional constraints on any proposal for
reform. Under the assumption that plaintiffs will continue to have a
right of action in United States courts, a solution to the problem of
unsatisfied judgments necessarily implicates the President's willingness to relax executive control over blocked assets of foreign countries. However, as discussed below, it is unlikely that the President will
ever completely disavow the use of the executive waiver provision.
C.

The President Will Not Voluntarily Forgo the Use of the
Executive Waiver Provision

As the formal head of state and the elected representative of a
single national constituency, a President has strong incentives to avail
herself of the maximum authority granted by Congress to protect foreign assets from attachment by plaintiffs. First, any President with limited assets for diplomatic leverage will be reluctant to allow these
assets to be attached by FSIA plaintiffs to satisfy a judgment. Stuart
Eizenstat, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, underscored the importance of presidential control of blocked assets in testimony before
Congress:
In the case of Vietnam, the leverage provided by approximately
$350 million in blocked assets... played an important role in persuading Vietnam's leadership to address important U.S. concerns in
the normalization process. These concerns included full accounting of POWs and MIAs from the Vietnam War, [as well as] accepting
responsibility for over $200 million in U.S. claims ....
In addition, blocked assets have helped us to secure equitable
settlements of claims of U.S. nationals against such countries as
Romania, Bulgaria, and Cambodia in the context of normalization
64
of relations.'
163 144 CONG. REc. H5711 (daily ed. July 16, 1998) (statement of Rep. Obey).
164 Terrorism Hearing,supra note 13, at 35 (prepared statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury).
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Second, the President's position differs from Congress's in that
he cannot solely concern himself with the here-and-now interests of
domestic constituents, but must also safeguard the long-term interests
of American foreign policy by fostering long-term relationships with
foreign countries. To that end, the President must be sensitive to the
welfare of American citizens living in foreign countries, the manner in
which American foreign policy is administered and viewed overseas,
and the reputation of the United States in the international community. Thus, if attachment of foreign assets in the United States could
provoke a reciprocal response against United States citizens or assets
overseas, the President is in the best position to take remedial actions
in the United States to protect Americans living abroad. After invoking the executive waiver provision, the White House justified the President's actions in a press release: "If the U.S. permitted attachment of
diplomatic properties, then other countries could retaliate, placing
our embassies and citizens overseas at grave risk. Our ability to use
foreign properties as leverage in foreign policy disputes would also be
65
undermined."'
Finally, as the elected representative of a single national constituency, the President has stronger institutional incentives than Congress
to safeguard the interests of American terrorist victims who suffered
injuries before the introduction of the 1996 amendments to the FSIA,
as well as the interests of victims who have not yet obtained a judgment. Given the limited availability of resources belonging to state
sponsors of terrorism within America's borders, the President is likely
to invoke the executive waiver provision to prevent the arbitrary distribution of foreign assets to plaintiffs on a "first-come, first-serve" basis.
According to Eizenstat:
[The legislation] would benefit one small group of Americans over
a far larger group of Americans. Those with judgments in court
since the FSIA amendments of 1996 would benefit over others,
many of whom have waited decades to be compensated by Cuba and
Iran for both the loss of property and the loss of the lives of their
loved ones, and would leave no assets for their claims and others
that may

follow.'

66

One congressman used Cuba to illustrate the importance of allowing
executive discretion to waive the exception to immunity for blocked
assets: "[W]ith respect to Cuba[,] there are 5,911 claims totaling $1.9
billion, but there are only $148.3 million in Cuban government assets
165 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Waiver of Law Allowing
Judicial Attachment of Diplomatic Properties (Oct. 21, 1998), available at http://

www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/10/981021-wh2.htm.
166 Terrorism Hearing,supra note 13, at 34 (prepared statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury).
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available to justify those claims. This proposal would contribute to a
first-come, first-serve approach, which would not be equitable to those
people who are left out.

'167

A second class of plaintiffs who would suffer from a liberal attachment policy under the 1996 amendments are American terrorist victims who pursue claims against state sponsors of terrorism in
alternative forums. For example, American plaintiffs with judgments
from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal would be relegated to the same
position as Flatow if the attachment of Iranian assets in the United
States provoked Iran to withdraw from the Algiers Accords. In fact, as
the government observed during Flatow, the district court's very willingness to entertain Flatow's attachment of a tribunal award owed to
Iran undermined the legitimacy of American claims currently before
the tribunal:
The delay of payment occasioned by the outstanding writ of
attachment now threatens to undermine the position of the United
States before the Tribunal, and has now formally been raised by
Iran as an issue in [a case raised by the United States against Iran]
168
.... based on Iran's violation of the Algiers Accords.
In conclusion, it should come as no surprise that a President employing a utilitarian approach to disbursing the limited assets of FSIA
defendants would be loathe to allow a small subsection of plaintiffs to
execute judgments that swallow the limited assets belonging to state
sponsors of terrorism. President Clinton's decision to exercise the executive waiver provision implicitly recognized that those assets could
either be divided more equitably among a larger number of plaintiffs,
or reserved for use in negotiations with state sponsors of terrorism.
Thus, in formulating a proposal for reform, the President's strong incentives to protect the immunity of blocked assets impose the significant constraint that a workable solution cannot depend on the
President's willingness to forgo the use of the executive waiver
provision.
IV
A PROPOSAL

FOR REFORM

Even before the introduction of the 1996 amendments, courts
recognized the tension between the jurisdictional grant and remedial
authority provided by the FSIA. As the Third Circuit noted in City of
Englewood v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:
167 144 CONG. REc. H5711 (daily ed. July 16, 1998) (statement of Rep. Obey).
168 Renewed Request of the United States for Expedited Consideration of Motion to
Quash at 2, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 97-396
(RCL)).
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The exceptions to the immunity from execution are not precisely equivalent to the exceptions to immunity from adjudication.
The latter permits adjudication of actions based upon commercial
activity in the United States and of disputes over title to property
without regard to commercial activity. Section 1610(a), however,
permits execution on property of a foreign state only if it is used for
commercial activity in the United69States, and then only in the instances listed in that subsection.'
Because of the unique nature of the jurisdictional grant under the
1996 amendments, the flaws in the FSIA's execution provisions have
had a more profound impact on plaintiffs seeking to satisfy judgments
for noncommercial injuries. 170 The futility of the execution process
under the 1996 amendments not only takes a substantial financial and
emotional toll on plaintiffs, but also diminishes the public's perception of the executive branch' 7' and creates friction between Congress
72
and the President.
These adverse consequences primarily accrue once the plaintiff
has invoked the judicial system and secured a judgment. From the
plaintiff's perspective, substantial financial and emotional resources
are expended through negotiating the turbulent process of initiating
a lawsuit, obtaining a judgment, and struggling with the executive
branch to execute the judgment. Furthermore, institutional friction
between Congress and the President largely concerns the treatment of
plaintiffs who have already obtained judgments. Whenever a court
issues an order stating that a plaintiff has been wronged and is legally
entitled to damages, that order adopts independent normative significance. The moral imperative to enforce a court-ordered judgment
implicates not only abstract principles ofjustice, but also the integrity
of the judicial system and the legitimacy of legislation purporting to
create meaningful rights for terrorist victims. Invoking Flatow, one
Congressman argued: "[W] e are saying simply that a judgment has
been declared and these people have the right to exercise that judgment, which they won based on the right to sue, which we in the Congress gave them." 73 Such rhetoric demonstrates that tensions arising
from the 1996 amendments to the FSIA increase exponentially with
regard to the postjudgment phase of cases like Flatow.
169
170

773 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1985).

As a Washington Post editorial stated: "Congress never should have passed, nor President Clinton signed, a lav that could only offer Mr. Flatowjustice by depriving the administration of control over important instruments of foreign policy." Editorial, Lawsuits and
Terrorism, WASH. Posr, Dec. 26, 1999, at B6.
'71
Terror Victim's Kin Criticizes Clinton Waiver, supranote 161 (quoting Stephen Flatow
as saying that "'[p1rotecting Iranian assets of any type is equivalent to the FBI director
saying he's tough on gangsters but needs to be sensitive to the Mob'").
172
144 CONG. REc. H7267-68 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1998).
173 Id. at H5712 (daily ed. July 16, 1998) (statement of Rep. Engel).
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Thus, any effective proposal for reforming hollow-rights legislation like the FSIA must incorporate four distinct elements. First,
plaintiffs must have the means to attach the assets of the defendants
themselves, and cannot rely on settlement proposals administered by
the executive branch. Second, the proposal must squarely confront
Congress's reluctance to fix the outcome of plaintiffs' judgment executions by either eliminating the grant ofjurisdiction under the 1996
amendments or removing the President's discretion to waive the exception to immunity for blocked assets. Third, any proposal must circumvent the strong presidential incentives to prevent any attachment
of foreign assets as running counter to the national interest. Finally, a
proposal for reform should address these concerns at the jurisdictional level before plaintiffs invest significant financial and emotional
resources in obtaining the moral trappings that accompany a verdict
and judgment.
Significantly, these criteria demonstrate the impracticality of solutions proposed by other commentators. Vadnais's proposal to eliminate the punitive damages provisions of the FSIA and facilitate the
submission of claims directly to the executive branch 174 fails to account for Congress's insistence upon maintaining credibility with the
American public, as well as the need for a solution that functions at
the jurisdictional stage. Similarly, Micco's suggestion to transfer
claims arising from terrorist activities to the International Court of
Justice 1 75 is untenable due to the unwillingness of American citizens
to accept a repeal of the jurisdiction granted by the 1996 amendments.17 6 Particularly in the wake of the World Trade Center tragedy,
any withdrawal ofjurisdiction that adversely impacts terrorist victims is
politically unfeasible.
In light of the parameters established above, this Note proposes
to resolve the conflicts arising under hollow-rights legislation in general, and the FSIA in particular, by amending such legislation to require that funds be available to satisfy the judgment requested by the
plaintiff as a condition ofjurisdiction under § 1605 (a) (7). Ideally, the
plaintiff could satisfy this jurisdictional requirement by locating unblocked assets belonging to the defendant country that are being used
174
175
176

See Vadnais, supra note 10, at 226-27.
See Micco, supra note 17, at 137-41.
As Stephen Flatow remarked during an interview on 60 Minutes.
[A] sovereign country has the right to launch Tomahawk missiles at another country to protect its rights .... I don't have $60 million to launch
those kinds of missiles. But now I have something that's purely American.... I have American jurisdiction over the people who sponsored the
terrorist attack which killed Alisa.

60 Minutes: In Memory of Alisa (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 4, 1998), available at LEXIS,

News, Transcripts, CBS News Transcripts.
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for a commercial purpose within the United States.' 7 7 If such commercial assets are unavailable, the plaintiff could petition the executive branch for a license to attach blocked assets of a specified value in
the event that the court finds for the plaintiff on the merits. Under
these circumstances, the district court would be required to limit the
amount of the judgment to the value of assets specified in the license.
If no blocked or commercial assets are available, then the court
should rule that the plaintiff has failed to meet the jurisdictional requirement and thus may not litigate his claim.
The suggestion that the jurisdiction of the courts should be calibrated to the ability of the judiciary to furnish and enforce a remedy is
not new. As early as 1864, Chief Justice Taney asserted in Gordon v.
United States that the power of a court to hear a case under Article III
of the United States Constitution depends on the court's ability to
enforce the judgment it provides:
The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every
judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an
award the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the
aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion,
which would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon
the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some future time
sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion
into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this Court
178

Similarly, in District of Columbia v. Eslin, the plaintiff appealed
from the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court pursuant to an Act of
Congress that extended the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to contracts entered into by the Board of Works of the District of Columbia. 179 While Eslin's appeal was pending, Congress repealed the grant
of jurisdiction, stating that "'all proceedings pending [under the repealed act] shall be vacated, and no judgment heretofore rendered in
pursuance of said act shall be paid."' 8 0 In response, the Supreme
Court immediately dismissed the appeal, citing its inability to provide
an appropriate remedy: "As no judgment now rendered by this court
would have the sanction that attends the exercise ofjudicial power, in
its legal or constitutional sense, the present appeal must be dismissed
for want ofjurisdiction and without any determination of the rights of
the parties."' 8 1 Concededly, Flatow and its progeny are distinguishable
177
178

179

180
669).
181

See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
117 U.S. app. 697, 702 (1864).
183 U.S. 62, 62 (1901).
Id. at 64 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 387, 29 Stat. 665,
Id. at 66 (emphasis omitted).
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from Gordon and Eslin in that there is no statutory bar to the execution
of judgment under the 1996 amendments. Nevertheless, this Note asserts that the de facto impossibility of overcoming the discretionary
policy decisions of Congress and the President to satisfy hollow-rights
judgments as a matter of course warrants a modification of the jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims.
The practical effect of this Note's proposal for reform is to transform the purely judicial remedy envisioned by the 1996 FSIA amendments into a two-step remedial process incorporating both the
executive branch and the courts. Assuming that unblocked assets
dedicated to commercial activities are unavailable, the President
would be required to intervene at the jurisdictional stage to determine
whether to allow prospective plaintiffs to attach blocked assets to satisfy an eventual judgment. While critics of this proposal could argue
that this degree of presidential influence over the jurisdiction of the
courts creates constitutional complications, § 1605 (a) (7) of the FSIA
already grants the executive branch significant control over the jurisdiction of the courts. As the Libyan government argued in a subsequent case brought under the 1996 amendments:
As implemented by the Secretary of State, § 1605(a) (7) ...permits
civil suits against a small group of "state sponsors of terrorism" for
injury or death resulting from the commission of any of the five
offenses listed in the section. The Secretary of State need give no
reason for selecting a state for special treatment in the courts of the
United States. The Secretary's decision constitutes a nonreviewable,
political decision of the highest order, yet it is the linchpin of the
court's jurisdiction under § 1605(a) (7).182
While the district court did not comment specifically on Libya's con1 83
stitutional objection, the court's denial of Libya's motion to dismiss
indicates that Congress's Article III powers to control the jurisdiction
of the federal judiciary may be channeled through the executive
branch to a limited degree.
Furthermore, the idea of executive involvement in cases brought
under the FSIA is not a new one, and was in fact intended by Congress
under the VTVPA:
The Committee's intent is that the President will review each
case when the court issues a final judgment to determine whether to
use the national security waiver, whether to help the plaintiffs collect from a foreign state's non-blocked assets in the United States[,]
whether to allow the courts to attach and execute against blocked
182 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 14, Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C.
2000) (No. Civ.A. 97-975 (RCL)).
183

See Price, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 12-14.
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to4 vest and pay those
assets, or whether to use existing authorities 18
assets as damages to the victims of terrorism.
While the solution proposed in this Note incorporates the idea of executive review, it offers advantages over the VTVPA by conducting this
review at the jurisdictional stage, thereby removing the uncertainties
of execution before plaintiffs and the courts expend their scarce resources. Furthermore, by establishing a bright-line jurisdictional rule,
Congress symbolically shares responsibility for engineering optimal
plaintiff outcomes, rather than shifting the onus onto the President to
absorb the fallout from Congress's ill-conceived legislative initiative.
In practice, granting the President increased input into jurisdiction under the 1996 amendments is advantageous for several reasons.
Broadly speaking, the proposal advocated by this Note creates a middle ground for presidents who are sympathetic to the claims of terrorist victims but are unwilling to throw open the floodgates of
attachment of foreign assets. By allowing the executive branch to license the attachment of foreign assets on a case-by-case basis, this solution reduces institutional tension and improves the public's
perception of the executive branch through selective grants of jurisdiction to worthy would-be plaintiffs. Thus, plaintiffs like Stephen
Flatow, whose daughter was murdered in a terrorist attack, will likely
fulfill the jurisdictional requirements more easily than, for example, a
plaintiff claiming that he was temporarily subjected to physical,
mental, and verbal abuse in a Libyan prison. 18 5 Most significantly, the
President can employ his discretionary authority to balance the administration's response to terrorism between compensation for American victims on the one hand, and diplomatic negotiation using
foreign assets for leverage on the other.
The importance of establishing the executive branch as the nerve
center of hollow-rights reform cannot be overstated. Left to its own
devices, Congress imposed a haphazard compensation scheme
through the VTVPA that arbitrarily differentiated among judgmentholding plaintiffs.' 8 6 The legislature selectively compensated highprofile litigants such as Stephen Flatow and celebrated newspaper reporter Terry Anderson 187 through a labyrinth of obscurely drafted
clauses bearing an eerie resemblance to corporate tax shelter provisions. 188 Meanwhile, in a sobering demonstration of special interest
H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 106-939, at 118 (2000).
Plaintiffs Complaint paras. 4-7, at 2-3, Price (No. 97-975 (RCL)).
186
See Robert Schlesinger, Victims of Terrorism Fight to Get Assets of Terror Sponsors, BoSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2001, at A12.
See Neely Tucker, 12 Americans WinJudgment Against Iraq over Captivity, WAsH. PoSr,
187
Dec. 8, 2001, at AS.
The VTVPA defines one class of "persons covered" as "aperson who ....filed a
188
suit under such section 1605(a) (7) [of the FSIA] on February 17, 1999, December 13,
184

185
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politics, plaintiffs who lacked "'a high-powered lobbyist or a highpower attorney to fight like the devil"' 18 9 were left with unsatisfied
judgments.190 Congress exacerbated its error by tying the normalization of diplomatic relations with Iran to the reimbursement of damage awards paid out of the United States Treasury, 19 1 a demand that
may haunt legislators as the United States seeks Iran's cooperation in
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade
Center. In the end, Congress's clumsy efforts to circumvent executive
use of the waiver provision demonstrate the need for an internally
consistent system of claim review supervised by the executive branch.
In light of the fallout from the VTVPA's ad hoc invasion of the United
States Treasury for particular plaintiffs, it is imperative to stem the
tide of potential judgments at the jurisdictional stage as would-be
plaintiffs clamor to enter the judgment pipeline following the World
Trade Center disaster.
A significant collateral benefit of this approach is that it creates a
more powerful incentive than the VTVPA for plaintiffs to forgo their
right to seek punitive damages. Under the statutory modification proposed by this Note, plaintiffs seeking only compensatory damages can
more easily make the necessary showing of available assets than a
plaintiff who demands significant punitive damages. Thus, the new
statutory regime would facilitate a more equitable distribution of
scarce foreign assets among larger numbers of plaintiffs rather than
allocate large punitive damages to plaintiffs on a first-come, first-serve
basis.
One possible objection to this proposal is that the suggested jurisdictional adjustment may eliminate a forum for plaintiffs pursuing a
judgment to vindicate their sense of moral outrage, rather than as a
vehicle for recovering actual monetary damages. Arguably the courthouse doors should open as widely for plaintiffs using the courtroom
as a soapbox to vent their fury at state sponsors of terrorism as they do
for plaintiffs with an executive license to attach assets. However, while
this conception of the judicial system as an emotional outlet for injured parties finds support in the common law, 19 2 prudential considerations obviously limit the capacity of courts to dispense therapy
1999, January 28, 2000, March 15, 2000, orJuly 27, 2000." Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002 (a) (2), 114 Stat. 1464, 1542.
189 Schlesinger, supra note 186 (quoting New Hampshire Congressman Robert C.
Smith).
190 Id. For example, Congress allocated funds to satisfy judgments obtained by the
families of Sara Duker and Matthew Eisenfeld, who were killed in a 1996 suicide attack on
an Israeli bus. The family of Ira Weinstein, an American citizen who was killed on the
same bus, also obtained a judgment but received no compensation from Congress. See id.
191 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
192
See, e.g., Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
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along with justice. A legislature properly exercising its custodial role
with respect to the judiciary should identify classes of disputes in
which the therapeutic objective is likely to diverge from the more im19 3
portant remedial function, and withhold jurisdiction accordingly.
Yet when Congress capriciously responds to contemporary events by
passing hollow-rights laws that conflate these two purposes, it should
restore integrity to the federal government by modifying the initial
grant of jurisdiction to make reasoned distinctions among plaintiffs.
Insofar as the executive license system provides a reasonably objective
measure of the relative worthiness of plaintiffs' claims, this strategy
offers the most palatable compromise.
CONCLUSION

Flatow v. Republic of Iran illustrates the inverse ofJustice Holmes's
famous aphorism: bad law makes hard cases. 194 Thus, the larger question implicated by this Note's analysis of Flatow is how best to restore
equilibrium to the judicial system when hollow-rights legislation creates new classes of plaintiffs without providing sufficient remedial
measures for enforcing their judgments. Resolving this problem is
made infinitely more complex by the institutional forces and public
expectations that preclude Congress from retracting its legislative mistake, especially when the effect of that mistake is to provide additional
legal rights to a litigious population.
One goal of this Note is to illustrate that no branch of the federal
government is single-handedly capable of adequately resolving the conundrums posed by Flatow. The judiciary is authorized to provide
plaintiffs with judgments, but is limited in its ability to enforce those
judgments against the will of the executive branch. Congress is empowered to either repeal the grant of jurisdiction under the 1996
amendments, or to eliminate the power of the President to obstruct
the execution of judgments; however, the ideological schizophrenia
that typically characterizes legislative behavior precludes lawmakers
from eliminating a popular grant ofjurisdiction or undermining the
President's ability to exert dominion over foreign assets in the interests of national security. Finally, while presidential stonewalling of
plaintiffs like Flatow may be a viable solution in the short term, the
institutional divisions and loss of esteem that inevitably result from
193 See id. ("The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force ....
But, subject to the restrictions of the Federal Constitution, the State may determine the
limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, and the character of the controversies which shall be
heard in them.").
194 Cf. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
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these tactics demonstrate the dangers of transitioning this practice
into a long-term strategy.
These realities, coupled with the symbolic importance of granting
plaintiffs meaningful and direct recourse against terrorist countries,
form the pillars of the reforms proposed by this Note. By mandating a
pre-trial finding that sufficient assets exist to satisfy a potential judgment in all cases arising under empty-rights legislation, this proposal
ensures that plaintiffs will not needlessly expend financial resources
and emotional energy, and encourages the executive branch to compromise with Congress by facilitating the attachment of blocked assets
under limited circumstances. This proposal also imposes the collateral benefit of transforming the original punitive theme of the 1996
amendments into a more equitable compensatory regime. Finally,
this Note's proposal for reform allows Congress to save face by functioning behind the scenes at the jurisdictional level to increase opportunities for plaintiff compensation, while leaving the nominal
structure of the 1996 amendments fully intact.
Unfortunately, the benefits of this approach come at a price. By
granting the executive branch significant control over the jurisdiction
of domestic courts, the proposed solution presents troubling implications for the separation of powers. On a more practical level, the process of selectively licensing plaintiffs to attach foreign assets may
create tension between plaintiffs, and expose the executive branch to
accusations of favoritism and "playing politics" in its licensing decisions. Nonetheless, this approach for reform presents significant advantages over the status quo, and takes a significant step towards
mitigating the legislative damage wrought by Congress's hollow
promises in the 1990s.

